Warrantless arrests and searches
The Terry v. Ohio presents an issue as to whether police are supposed to stop as well as patting down somebody on the street in a situation whereby the arrest is not really on a probable cause but whenever an articulated suspicion is apparent may indicating that a crime was actually occurring or else just about to occur (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006). The principles which were enunciated in the Terry holding however were later extended to provide a justification as to why search, seizure as well as retrieval of weapons which were located in an automobile in Michigan were able to succeed. Despite the arrest being formal as well as not violating the Fourth Amendment which is concerned with arrests and searches, this was a warrantless arrest and search which to some extend is allowable if there is no enough time for the officers to secure a warrant. Hence the argument is that under such circumstances, arrest and search without a warrant is allowable in order to prevent the occurrence of the suspected crime (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006).
The Florida v. Royer provided a clarification that the search was done on Royer’s luggage without a warrant which was dependent on Royer’s consent to search. The Royer case however went ahead to distinguish between situations whereby a police is permitted to ask the suspect of his willingness to answer questions in case of a voluntary encounter with the police in a public place (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006). The officer is also allowed to voluntarily listen to the answers given by the suspect for the evidence on suspect trial in case the circumstance ends up in full blown custodial seizure and arrest. The police officer also must identify himself during the encounter but this does not rightly convert any consensual encounter into a seizure. The Royer case also described to which length a suspect has the right not to any way listen to the officer, or even answer the questions the officers put to him as well as the right to leave the encounter (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006).
The defendants were not in any way arrested for Forth Amendment purposes because the court determined that the defendants had consented for search. However, the opinion of Drayton restated that the rules were inappropriate in the context of the Fourth Amendment; hence there should be a proper inquiry taking place for consideration of all the encounter circumstances. The Federal Court of Appeals also insisted that the interdictions in the bus were a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006). The officer also informed the suspect passenger in Bostick that he may probably refuse the search. Thus, the advisement involving the right to withhold consent finally after remand led to the attenuation of any seizure which is illegal. Hence at any rate, the Bostick case is actually cited to simply demonstrate that per se these rules were regarded as inappropriate standards for the purposes of the Fourth Amendments (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006).
Here the comparison of the rational for which the administrative inspections ar4e usually done has to be keenly considered as well as the probable case requirements involved. However, it has to be declared if the determination of the voluntary to confess under the Forth Amendment is however voluntary or not (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006). However, the place holds limitations to investigative detentions which involve suspect’s luggage seizure. Moreover, the court treated the case search consent by different standard. Also there was recognition by the court that consent was different from custodial interrogation, this is because consent which is given in the streets there may be compulsion which is inherent depending on the custodial settings whereby no coercive tactics should be used by the police. The environment in which the police questioning should take place is also important, thus it should be within a private set up in order to facilitate compliance with the suspect hence it should not be done publicly.
In this case where the respondent Russell was charged on three counts indictments usually returned against him as well as his codefendants. This led to a jury of trial which recognized his sole defense as entrapment, thus the respondent was actually fully convinced that all the three counts placed upon him were unlawful because they involved manufacturing and processing methamphetamine which is a narcotic which to him be sentenced for two concurrent terms (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006). However, the conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court on the basis that an undercover agent was involved in the supply of an essential chemical used to manufacture the narcotic which was the basis for the conviction of the respondent. Thus, in this case decided the agent’s conduct to supply the chemical for manufacture of a substance which is controlled established the defense. Hence in such kind of cases courts has always found entrapment, irrespective of predisposition in cases where the government is involved in the supply of defendants with contraband (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006).
The constitutional rights presented involve the right to be presented by a counsel upon making a formal request. Thus, the court may mean that the absence of a counsel would probably lead to assume that the offer to have a counsel was presented to the petitioner upon which he declined. Or, else the petitioner was aware of his right but chose to forego it willingly. However, the validity of the presumptions above must be immediately called to question considering the accused is not in any way supposed to protect themselves in trials unless by requesting for a counsel. Hence the constitutional right of been presented by a counsel in court upholds no matter the nature of the crime which is being dealt with (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006).
Justice Black concurs with the court’s judgment that the petitioner should be entitled to be represented by a counsel according to the reasons which had been stated out in the opinions during the reversal. Justice Black also reiterates on the importance of any defendant charged with any crime to be presented by a counsel (Israel, Kamisar, Lafave and King, 2006). Hence he dissented from the denial of the court to provide a counsel as well as announcing that he considered it unpredictable and impossibly vague standard. Thus, according to him the defendant was entitled to a counsel in that case because Fourteenth Amendment usually makes it applicable and guarantee for a counsel in all the criminal prosecutions. Hence the Betts needed to be presented by a counsel for defense irrespective of their case was Justice Black view on the issue.
Israel, J. H., Kamisar, Y., Lafave, W. R. and King, N. J. (2006). Criminal Procedure And the Constitution: Warrantless arrests and searches. Phoenix: West Group.
Warrantless arrests and searches